Designing a minimal operating system to emulate 32/64bits x86 code snippets, shellcode or malware in Bochs

Presented by: Elias Bachaalany (@0xeb), Microsoft

<u>Overview</u>

Introduction
System overview
System design
Demo

Introduction

So what's this talk about?

- How to design a minimal operating system for the purpose of debugging code snippets or malware
- Design decisions and challenges faced

Motivation

• Static analysis is great, but not all the time:

- encrypted/packed/obfuscated
- long/complex algorithms
- Debugging shellcode
- Debugging a selected piece of code or subroutine
- Emulate an MS Windows malware from a non MS Windows environment
- Emulation should be as accurate as the real processor

Why use emulators and VMs?

- Provides an environment for quick and easy experimentation
- Run code without risk of infection
- Dynamic code analysis
 - Unpacking
 - Algorithm recovery
 - Crypto algorithms
 - Hashing algorithms
 - etc...
- Security research

Candidate emulators

To debug malware or arbitrary x86/x64 code snippets, we need a programmable emulator with this minimal functionality:

- Emulation control:
 start, stop, suspend
 - manage disk images
- Debug control:
 - o single stepping, tracing
 - register manipulation
 - o breakpoints: add, delete, disable
 - physical memory read/write, ...

Reinventing the wheel?

There are plenty of emulators, why not choose an existing solution?

- Emulation libraries:
 - o pyemu, x86emu, ida-x86emu, libemu, ...

Selecting an emulator (1)

While emulation libraries are highly programmable and simple to use, they:

- are not necessarily mature enough: wrong instruction emulation in some cases
- do not support all instructions: easily defeated if obscure (or unsupported) instructions are used
- emulation tend be slower than inside a VM

Selecting an emulator (2)

On the other hand, popular VM products are:

- mature: very accurate emulation
- <u>fast</u>: they employ dynamic binary translation or hardware aided virtualization
- programmable: emulation state and debug control are provided
 - VMWare can be controlled with a gdb stub
 - Bochs provides a plugin system or a command line debugger (bochsdbg.exe)
 - Etc...
- <u>capable of full OS emulation</u>: debug a complete operating system and thus they support obscure instructions

This emulation system is composed of:

- A programmable emulator: Bochs, Qemu, Vmware, ...
- Driver program (also referred to as the host)
 - Prepares the disk image
 - Provides the minimal operating system
 - Communicates with the emulator
- Code to emulate
 - Packed malware
 - Shellcode
 - Code snippets

Input files

- .dll | .so file
- PE | ELF file
- Binary | Shellcode

Image creation

- PE | ELF loader
- Processor structures setup
- Physical memory content setup

Emulator

- Bochs, VMWare, Qemu, etc...
- Debug control API
 - Single stepping
 - Bpt managment

Image execution engine

- MBR
- Kernel
- API and OS emulation
- Host / Guest communication

Image creation

- Setup the processor structures
 - Set up protected mode
 - GDT / IDT / PTEs
- Transform the code to be emulated into a disk image
 - File loaders (PE loader, ELF loader, etc...)

Image execution

- Boot the emulator
- Handle system services
- Guest<->Host and Host<->Guest communication
- Target OS emulation (exception handling, system structure emulation, etc...)

Disk image creation

Disk image creation

Image creation Image file loader • Structured input: PE, ELF, ... Shellcode or code snippets -OS structure preparation Page directory setup Physical memory contents -OS file system design VM image file format Represent all needed input in a single disk image

The virtual memory manager (VMM)

- The driver program implements a virtual memory manager class:
 - The virtual memory is set up prior to execution
 - Page table entries setup is based on the input file(s)
 - For example, the PE file loader will dictate the VM layout
 - VM libraries are written in C++
 - Each VMM operation has side effects on the physical memory:
 - Allocate virtual memory -> setup proper PTEs
 - All virtual memory operation side effects are serialized and flushed to the disk image

The virtual memory manager

The VMM class implements methods such as:

```
// Apply page table entry default attributes
// attr has one of the PGATTR_xxx constants
virtual void apply_attr(vmm_page_attr_t attr) = 0;
```

```
// Maps multiple pages
virtual vmm_err_t map_many_pages(
   uint16 selector,
   ea_t offs,
   ea_t *start_phys_loc,
   size_t sz,
   bool skip_already_mapped,
   bool user phys loc) = 0;
```

```
// Maps a single page
virtual vmm_err_t map_page(
    uint16 selector,
    ea_t offs,
    ea_t *phys_location,
    bool user_phys) = 0;
```

The virtual memory manager

 When emulating x86, the x86_vmm class implements the map_page() so it creates the appropriate PDEs and PTEs

```
vmm_err_t internal_x86_vmm_t::map_page_ex(
    uint16 selector,
    uint32 offs,
    uint32 *phys_location,
    uint32 *ptr_pde,
    uint32 *ptr_pte,
    page_dir_entry_4kb_t *o_pde,
    page_table_entry_t *o_pte,
    bool user phys)
```

- The VM class simply serializes what is needed to be written to the physical memory when a map_page() is requested
- All memory transactions are recorded into the serializer.

The VMM operation serializer

 The VMM operation serializer can be subclassed so it flushes the side effects to a file (in the case of disk image creation) or to the virtual machine (during the image execution phase for example).

```
class vmm_serializer_t
{
public:
    virtual bool serialize(
        const uint64 addr,
        const void *buffer,
        const size_t sz) = 0;
    virtual ~vmm_serializer_t() { }
};
```

The virtual memory manager

 Here we can see how "a change page protection" operation serializes (or records) what changes are needed to be applied to the physical memory

```
vmm_err_t internal_x86_vmm_t::ch_page_attr(
    uint16 selector,
    uint32 offs,
    vmm_page_attr_t attr)
```

```
page_table_entry_t *pte;
uint32 ptr_pte;
```

if (!ch_page_attr_ex(selector, offs, &ptr_pte, &pte, attr))
 return vmm_err_not_mapped;

```
serialize(ptr_pte, pte, sizeof(*pte));
```

return vmm err ok;

The virtual memory manager

 Since the emulation system need to support x64, we had to implement an x64 memory manager class

```
vmm_err_t map_page_ex(
    uint64 linear,
    uint64 *outphys,
    uint64 *phys = NULL,
    bool remap = false,
    pte 4kb 64 t *pte attr = NULL);
```

```
vmm_err_t map_many_pages_ex(
    uint64 linear,
    size_t sz,
    vmm64_mdl_t *mdl,
    bool remap = false,
    uint64 *outphys1 = NULL,
    uint64 *phys = NULL,
    pte_4kb_64_t *pte_attr = NULL);
```

This class supports Page-Map Level 4 (PML4) tables

File loaders

- The emulation system should be able to interpret an executable or raw instruction stream:
 - PE files
 - ELF files
 - Shellcode
 - Code snippets
- A PE loader is implemented to parse PE files:
 - Parse the main executable
 - Parse dependencies
 - Resolve imports

PE loader (1)

- The PE loader class:
 - Knows how to parse PE files and their dependencies:
 - Import resolution
 - Relocation handling
 - Proper handling of forwarded API
 - It needs a virtual memory manager class to map the PE sections to the virtual memory
- Additionally, the PE loader can interpret a configuration file so it knows how to deal with dependencies:
 - Can generate dummy DLL stubs
 - Map a DLL as it is
 - Handle API emulation via scripting

PE loader (2)

- The PE loader is also responsible for setting up:
 - The PEB
 - The TIB
 - The NT structures:
 - NT32_RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETER
 - NT32_LDR_MODULE (Load and Init order)

- The PE loader also knows how to do: – Module management:
 - LoadLibrary(), GetProcAddress(), etc...
 - VA to Physical conversion (and vice versa)
 - etc...

PE loader – startup configuration (1)

 The PE loader reads a special file that instructs it how to interpret modules and API emulation

The startup supports such directives:

- "map-module: path=path_to_module, load_address=[ADDR|ASLR|default]" <- Map the module as it is in the VM

- "imitate-module: path=path_to_module, load_address=[ADDR|ASLR|default]" <- Generate a dummy stub containing all the exported entries

PE loader – startup configuration (2)

• Continued....:

 - "map-file: va=load_address, file=file.bin,page_prot=flags" <- map a binary file to the desired VA (load shellcode into the emulation environment for instance)

– "map-mem: va=load_address, size=SZ, page_prot=flags" <- maps uninitialized memory</p>

These directives instruct the PE loader how to load and map PE files and their dependencies

PE loader – modules configuration (1)

- Each module described in the startup configuration file has its own configuration script:
 - Implement certain API emulation of the module
 - Redirect certain API:
 - Redirect functionality to another module
 - Redirect functionality to a script
- The module configuration file contains directives such as:
 - "func: name=GetProcAddress, entry=redirModule.NewApi" <- to redirect an API in this module to another module
 - "func: name=FuncName, purge=N, retval=123" <- Generate a dummy API stub that always returns 123 and purges N bytes from the stack

PE loader – modules configuration (2)

• Continued:

- "func: name=FuncName, entry=ScriptFunctionName" <- to redirect an API in this module to a function in a script file on the host
- For example, "kernel32.py" may contain the following:

```
///func: name=Beep, entry=beep, purge=8
def beep():
   param1 = Emu.GetParam(1)
   param2 = Emu.GetParam(2)
   print "I am Beep(%d, %d)\n" % (param1, param2)
   # The emulated function returns 1:
   SetRegValue(1, "EAX")
   # Return value controls execution of the debugged application:
   # 1 = suspend execution
   # 0 = continue transparently
   return 0
```

PE loader – Dummy API stub

- This dummy stub is generated due to an entry in kernel32.py as:
- "func: name=GetProcessAffinityMask, purge=12, retval=0"
- The stub calls a dummy entry in the kernel <this makes it easy to break on all dummy (not overwritten API calls)

7DD63647	kernel32	2 Get1	ProcessAffinityMask proc near
7DD63647	mov	eax,	offset kernel32 GetProcessAffinityMask
7DD6364C	call	near	ptr bochsys BxUndefinedApiCall
7DD63651	mov	eax,	0 ; <- retval
7DD63656	retn	12 ;	<- purge value
7DD63656	kernel32	2 Get1	ProcessAffinityMask endp
7DD63656		_	

PE loader – Script API stub

- This stub allows you to implement an API via a script.
- It uses the guest-to-host calls (explained later)
- user32.py may contain:

```
#///func: name=MessageBoxA, entry=messagebox, purge=0x10
def messagebox():
    param2 = Emu.GetParam(2)
    print "[Python] MessageBoxA() has been called: %x %s\n" %
        (param2, Emu.GetSzString(param2)))
    SetRegValue(1,"eax")
    # continue execution
    return 0
Causing the following stub to be generated:
```

USER32.dll:7DC53532	user32	MessageBoxA proc near
USER32.dll:7DC53532	mov	eax, offset user32 MessageBoxA
USER32.dll:7DC53537	call	near ptr bochsys HostCall
USER32.dll:7DC5353C	retn	10h
USER32.dll:7DC5353C	user32	MessageBoxA endp

PE loader – Forwarded API stub

 This stub allows you to redirect the functionality of an API to another module / API:

#///func: name=GetProcAddress, entry=bochsys.BxGetProcAddress

KERNEL32.dll:7DD63642 kernel32_GetProcAddress proc near KERNEL32.dll:7DD63642 jmp bochsys_BxGetProcAddress KERNEL32.dll:7DD63642 kernel32_GetProcAddress endp

 This stub redirects kernel32!GetProcAddress to the kernel's GetProcAddress() <- Guest-To-Host will take care of the emulation

Shellcode / Code snippet loader

- The shellcode / code snippet loader is very simple:
 - Read the startup configuration file and map the needed binary images into the virtual machine
 - The virtual memory manager is instructed to allocate and map pages per the configuration file

PE loader + VMM + Disk file

This is how the system looks so far:

Loader

- Parse PE file
- Load dependencies
- Etc...



VMM

- Allocate pages
- Serialize VM operation side effects
- etc...

Flush VMM contents to disk

Disk image writer

- Write MBR
- Write the kernel
- Write GDT/IDT
- Flush serialized bytes
- Etc....

Shellcode + VMM + Disk file

This is how the system looks so far:



Boot images on Intel compatible CPUs

- On Intel compatible processors, a bootable disk image should have an MBR at the first sector
- The MBR loads a boot sector from the active partition
- The boot sector then loads the kernel and starts the operating system
- In our case, only the MBR is used (two sectors). It will load the kernel and the other components

Disk image format - Overview

The disk image is composed of:

- Boot code (MBR at sector zero)
- The OS image
 - GDT/IDT setup
 - Page directory setup
 - Physical memory contents
- Meta data appended at the end of the disk



Disk image format - MBR

- The MBR occupies two sectors
- How it works and what it does is discussed in the "Image Execution" section

Disk image format – OS image (1)

 The OS image contains everything that was serialized during the input loading time

 Everytime the PE loader maps a PE file or its dependencies in memory, the requests are recorded into the VMM serializer class

Disk image format – OS image (2)

- The OS image simply contains a stream header followed by a list of streams
 - Stream header:
 - number of streams
 - header version
 - etc...
 - One or more streams of the following format:
 - stream_size: the size of the stream
 - stream_attributes: some attributes
 - physical_memory_location_to_load_at: where to write
 - stream_bytes: the bytes to write to physical memory

Disk image format – OS image (3)

- The driver program creates streams indirectly each time a memory is allocated or written to through the VMM class
- The driver uses the VMM to allocate / setup the IDT and GDT contents at a fixed / reserved address (same as IDT and GDT addresses in Windows XP)

 The driver will flush the system structures (GDT/IDT) to the disk image into streams

Disk image format – OS image (4)

 Additional meta-data is appended at the end of the disk image

 The meta-data is not part of the mini-OS but is used by the driver:

- Store cache data
- Store configuration blob
- Etc...

Image execution

Image Execution - overview

- The master boot record (MBR)
 Load the streams
 - Jump to kernel

The OS kernel

- Responsible for target OS emulation
 - Exception handling / emulation
 - System structure emulation (PEB, TIB structs...)
 - Etc…
- Host to guest communication
- API emulation / extension (through guest-to-host communication)

Boot process

- Enter unreal mode
 - Provide 4GB physical memory access from 16-bit real mode

Load the streams

- Verify the stream header
- Load all streams:
 - GDT/IDT
 - Page directory setup
 - OS image stream: it is part of the streams. Entrypoint is patched-in
 - during the disk image creation phase
 - Other streams
- Switch to protected or long mode
- Transfer execution to the kernel

Boot process

The boot code:

- 16-bit real mode code
- Enters unreal-mode to access memory > 1MB
- Verifies the OS image format
- Load OS image to physical memory
- Page table entries are also loaded
- Load the kernel
- Jump to the kernel entry point

Boot process

; Clear bios boot text call clear_screen

; Load remaining boot sector code call load boot sector

; Show loading message call display_loading_message

; Enable 4GB access call setup_unreal

; Load all streams call load_objs

; Load the kernel call load kernel





; Loads the appropriate kernel load kernel: mov eax, [data.kernel flags] test eax, KERNEL FLAG 64BITS MODE jnz short .64 ; Start 32bit kernel call load 32bit kern .64: ; Start 64bit kernel call load 64bit kern

Memory layout at the kernel start (1)

The memory layout

- First 1MB reserved
- At 8MB the PDBR (CR3)
- Initial page directory setup
- Uninitialized pages:
 - BSS sections of modules
- Initialized pages:
 - Main program memory
 - Dependencies:
 - Modules
 - Injected binary files



- IVT
- MBR
 - • •

<u>>= 8MB</u>

- CR3 -> PDBR
- PDE / PTEs

> 8MB + size(PTEs)

- Main module
- Dependencies
- BSS memory
- Etc....

Memory layout at the kernel start (2)

Physical memory (0-4GB)

- MBR (identity mapped)
- Main module
- Dependencies
- Etc....

•

- The VMM class assures proper page table entry setup prior to execution
- The kernel does not update the PTEs after it runs (it is done with guest-to-host calls instead)

Virtual memory

- MBR (identity mapped) <u>0x401000 - END</u>
- Main module 0x1000000 – END_1
- Module 1....

<u>0x1A400000–END_2</u>

• Module 2....

<u>0xE0000000 – END OS</u>

- OS kernel
- IDT handlers...

<u>0x8003F000 - 0x80040400</u>

- GDTR \rightarrow GDT
- IDTR -> IDT

Kernel services

- Setup IDTs (for exception handling)
- Exception dispatcher
- Dispatch TLS callbacks
- Transfer execution to user code
- Handle program termination
 - Exit callbacks:
 - TLS or DLLMain()
 - Call exit script (guest-to-host)
- Guest-to-Host and Host-to-Guest communication
- Emulation environment
- Debugging facilities

Kernel initialization - Overview

- At the time of MBR-to-kernel transfer all memory content is set up already
- The kernel starts in Ring 0
- Ring 0 initialization code:
 - Setup R0 stack space
 - Build and setup IDT, GDT and TSS
 - Setup the Ring3 FS selector
 - Install the unhandled exception handler
 - Init FPU
 - Jump to Ring 3 initialization code in the kernel
 - Switch to Ring3 via an IRET instruction
- Ring 3 initialization code:
 - Parse the input file and decide what to do
 - Dispatch TLS callbacks / DLLMain()
 - Or just call main program's entrypoint
 - -> Return to ExitProcess() after the target main() terminates

Kernel initialization – Interrupts (1)

The following interrupts are set up with CPL=0

- DIVIDE_BY_ZERO (0x00): Handles division by zero
- SINGLE_STEP (0x01): Handles single stepping
- INVALID_OPCODE (0x06): Handles invalid opcodes exceptions
- STACK_EXCEPTION (0x0C): Handles stack exceptions
- GPF (0x0D): Handles general exception faults
- FLOAT_P_ERROR (0x10): Handles floating point errors

 Those interrupts are triggered by the emulator when a fault or exception takes place

Kernel initialization – Interrupts (2)

- The kernel allows certain interrupts to be called from R3 in order to emulate the desired operating system.
- The following interrupts are set up with CPL=3
 BREAKPOINT (0x03): Handles breakpoints. R3 instructions should be able to issue an INT3 (0xCC or 0xCD, 0x03) without getting a GPF
 - INTO (0x04): Interrupt on overflow is allowed from R3

Kernel initialization – Interrupts (3)

- All interrupt handlers share the same stub
- The stub stores the registers context into a CONTEXT compatible structure
- Control is then passed from R0 (the interrupt handler) to the R3 exception dispatcher
- The exception dispatcher will convert *raw* exceptions into Windows exceptions

Kernel initialization – Interrupts (4)

• This is how the interrupt handler stubs look like:

Int0x00	_Handler:
mov	exception_code, 0
jmp	R0InterruptHandler
Int0x01	_Handler:
mov	exception_code, 1
jmp	R0InterruptHandler
Int0x03	_Handler:
mov	exception_code, 3
jmp	R0InterruptHandler
Int0x06	_Handler:
mov	exception_code, 6
jmp	R0InterruptHandler

Int0x0C_	_Handler:
mov	exception_code, 0Ch
jmp	R0InterruptHandler
Int0x0D	_Handler:
mov	exception_code, 0Dh
pop	exception_errno
jmp	R0InterruptHandler
Int0x0E_	_Handler:
mov	exception_code, 0Eh
pop	exception_errno
jmp	R0InterruptHandler
Int0x10_	Handler:
mov	exception_code, 10h
jmp	R0InterruptHandler
Int0x04_	_Handler:
mov	exception_code, 4
jmp	R0InterruptHandler

Kernel initialization – Interrupts (5)

Save the registers

EXPORT ROInterruptHandler, 0

.copy_regs:

; General registers

mov dword [_g_raw_excp+raw_exception_context_t.CONTEXT+CONTEXT._Eax], eax mov dword [_g_raw_excp+raw_exception_context_t.CONTEXT+CONTEXT._Ebx], ebx mov dword [_g_raw_excp+raw_exception_context_t.CONTEXT+CONTEXT._Ecx], ecx mov dword [_g_raw_excp+raw_exception_context_t.CONTEXT+CONTEXT._Edx], edx mov dword [_g_raw_excp+raw_exception_context_t.CONTEXT+CONTEXT._Edx], edx mov dword [_g_raw_excp+raw_exception_context_t.CONTEXT+CONTEXT._Esi], esi mov dword [_g_raw_excp+raw_exception_context_t.CONTEXT+CONTEXT._Edi], edi mov dword [_g_raw_excp+raw_exception_context_t.CONTEXT+CONTEXT._Edi], edi mov dword [_g_raw_excp+raw_exception_context_t.CONTEXT+CONTEXT._Edi], edi

; Copy page faulting address mov eax, cr2 mov dword [_g_raw_excp+raw_exception_context_t.page_fault_addr], eax

; Copy debug registers mov eax, dr0 mov dword [g raw excp+raw exception context t.CONTEXT+CONTEXT.Dr0], eax

Return to ring3

.goto_r3_dispatcher:

iret

```
.
.
mov dword [esp+0x00], _R3ExceptionDispatcher@4
```

Kernel initialization – Interrupts (6)

The kernel will convert the raw instructions to Windows exceptions:

DWORD WINAPI **R3ExceptionDispatcher**(struct _EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION_RECORD *List)

```
switch ( exception_code )
```

```
case INTNUM_DIVIDE_BY_ZERO:
```

```
// could also be EXCEPTION_INT_OVERFLOW
rec.ExceptionCode = EXCEPTION_INT_DIVIDE_BY_ZERO;
break;
```

```
case INTNUM_INVALID_OPCODE:
```

```
rec.ExceptionCode = EXCEPTION_ILLEGAL_INSTRUCTION;
break;
```

```
case INTNUM_PAGE_FAULT:
```

```
rec.ExceptionCode = EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION;
rec.NumberParameters = 2;
```

// page fault generate a special error code format:

// bit 3,2,1: (U/S)(R/W)(P)

rec.ExceptionInformation[0] = (exception_errno & 2) ? 1 : 0; rec.ExceptionInformation[1] = page_fault_addr; break;

Kernel initialization – Interrupts (7)

Then the kernel will walk the SEH list and call the handlers

while (List != (struct _EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION_RECORD *)-1)

if (List->Handler(&rec, List, &context, NULL) == ExceptionContinueExecution)

```
handled = 1;
break;
```

List = List->Prev;

```
if (!handled)
return UnhandledException();
```

```
return R3ExceptionDispatcherReturnToR0();
```

 Return back to R0 so we restore context registers and then finally transfer back to user mode (R3)

Kernel initialization – Syscalls

- The kernel allows system calls (from R3 to R0)
- A SYSCALL (0x2E) entry is created in the IDT with CPL=3
- It allows system calls to the kernel from user mode
- A short list of supported system calls
 - R3INVALIDATE_CACHE: Allows the user mode code to call the privileged instruction INVPLG to invalidate the TLB (translation lookaside buffer)
 - R3EXCEPTIONDISPATCHERRETURNTOR0: Allows the R3
 exception dispatcher to resume back to R0

 System call service number is passed via the EAX register: mov eax, SYSCALL_NUM int 0x2E

Dispatching TLS callbacks (1)

- TLS callbacks if present are parsed from the PE header
- They are called before the entry point and at the exit of the program
- TLS callbacks are dispatched within a try/except block

Dispatching TLS callbacks (2)

```
void WINAPI DispatchTlsCallbacks(
  LPVOID ImageBase,
  PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS inh,
  PIMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY tls_dir,
  DWORD dwReason)
```

```
// We want to save caller's return address if any exception occurs,
// then perhaps exception handler wants to return to caller
g_tls_jump_back.Eip = (DWORD) _ReturnAddress();
```

```
// TLS present?
if (
    inh->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes > IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS
    &&
    tls_dir->VirtualAddress != 0)
{
    PIMAGE_TLS_DIRECTORY32 tls =
        (PIMAGE_TLS_DIRECTORY32) ((DWORD)ImageBase + tls_dir->VirtualAddress);
    if (tls->AddressOfCallBacks != 0)
    {
        PIMAGE_TLS_CALLBACK *cb = (PIMAGE_TLS_CALLBACK *)tls->AddressOfCallBacks;
        DWORD i;
        // Walk through TLS callbacks
        for (i=0;cb[i] != NULL;i++)
            cb[i](ImageBase, dwReason, reserved);
    }
}    IMAGE_TLS_CALLBACK does to the test of the test of test of
```

Guest-to-host communication (1)

- API emulation takes place on the host side (outside the VM):
 - API calls are intercepted in the emulator using a control breakpoint
 - The driver inspects the EAX register -> API index
 - -Checks if index is registered with a script function
 - Invokes the script code -> can modify the VM registers and memory contents
 - Resume the breakpoint -> resumes VM

Guest-to-host communication (2)

• Example of emulated function stubs:

kernel32!Beep:

mov eax, 7DD6139Ah ; index of k32!Beep
call bochsys_BxHostCall
ret 8

user32!MessageBoxA: mov eax, 7DC53532h call bochsys_BxHostCall retn 10h

bochsys!BxHostCall: nop nop ; Control breakpoint here nop retn

Guest-to-host communication (3)

 Host receives a BP event -> checks the API emulation control breakpoint -> pass to script

int can_handle_breakpoint(debugevent_t &ev)

```
regs_t &regs = ev.regs;
```

```
if ( regs.rip != bp_hostcall.addr )
return -1; // Just ignore
```

```
// Do we know this address?
func_ctx_t *ctx = find_func_ctx(regs.rax);
if ( ctx != NULL && ctx->func_type == FUNCTYPE_FWDSCRIPT )
  return run_script_function(ctx->entry.c_str());
else
  return -1;
```

Guest-to-host: System services (1)

- Some core operating system API are a special case of the guest-to-host communication
- For example, a VirtualAlloc() call will be intercepted by the control breakpoint (on the host side) and then passed to a specialized function:
 - Parse parameters from the VM stack
 - Use the PE / VMM module to allocate memory
 - Serialize PDE/PTE allocations from the VMM class
 - De-serialize the changes back to the VM physical memory
 - Invalid TLB in the VM using a Host-To-Guest call

Guest-to-host: System services (2)

// Allocates memory and also updates the emulator's page table bool mem_alloc_live(ulongptr_t &addr, size_t sz, vmm_page_attr_t pg_attr)

vmm_pg_serializer ser; vmm_serializer_t *oldser = vmm->set_serializer(&ser);

```
sz = align_up(sz, X86_PAGE_SIZE);
bool ok = vmm->mem_alloc(addr, sz, pg_attr);
if ( ok )
  ok = upload_serialized_streams_to_emulator(&ser.get_list());
```

vmm->set_serializer(oldser);

return ok;

Host-to-guest communication

- Host needs to call inside the VM
- This is achieved via ROP like technique:
 - -Push the parameters on the stack
 - -Save input registers
 - Pass more parameters into the registers
 - Set EIP = Function to be called
 - Set [ESP] = Control BP
 - -Resume control -> Call the guest
 - Stop on Control BP
 - -Restore registers

Implementations

 This system has been implemented as a debugger plugin for IDA Pro

- The emulator used was Bochs
 - Open source
 - Programmable
- The minimal kernel (or OS) is implemented in C and Assembly
- There are 32bits and 64bits versions of this mini kernel

Practical use / demo

- Shellcode emulation
- Packed PE malware emulation
- 32/64bits code snippets emulation

Questions?

Thank you!